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2Eve can exploit dierent strategies for individual
eavesdropping, e.g., the simple intercept-resend strategy,
where she intercepts a qubit, measures it in a random
basis and resends to Bob a qubit, prepared in the mea-
sured state. In this way Eve gains some information in
exchange to disturbance introduced into Bob's key. In or-
der not to be detected, Eve is interested in increasing her
information and decreasing the Bob's disturbance. The
best known at present strategy for that end is the asym-
metric cloning of qubit [6, 7, 8]. In this type of attack
Eve attaches to the Alice's qubit two additional qubits
denoted E and M , performers a unitary transformation
of all three qubits, and sends the rst qubit further to
Bob, keeping the other two. After the disclosure of bases
used by Alice and Bob, Eve measures her two qubits in
the basis chosen by Alice. The cloning transformation,
























































i = j1i, and the summation in index is taken mod-
ulo 2. The real positive numbers  and  are parameters
of the cloning machine, they satisfy the relation

2
+  + 
2
= 1: (4)
The rst term in the r.h.s. of Eq. (3) corresponds
to Bob having no error, while the second term corre-
sponds to a ip of Bob's qubit. After the measurement
of her qubits Eve accepts the value of the measurement
of qubit E as the corresponding bit in the eavesdropped
key. There are three possible outcomes of measurements
by Eve and Bob of the state described by Eq. (3): (i)





=2; (ii) Bob receives the correct





=2; and, nally, (iii) Bob receives the incorrect





=2. Bob in no way can guess which of the cases
takes place (without revealing his bit to Alice). In the
meanwhile, Eve can distinguish rst two cases from the
third one by comparing the outcomes of measurements
of her two qubits E andM . Let us denote the dierence
(modulo 2) of these outcomes as m. If the outcomes co-
incide (m = 0), then the rst or the second case occurs,
if they dier (m = 1), then the third one takes place.







). On the basis of these probabilities one
can calculate information got by Bob and Eve. We per-




First we consider the case of n = 2. In this case two
qubits are used for sending a 4-valued symbol (quart).
Eve clones each qubit separately, measures her qubits in
correct basis and keeps the values of E qubits for her
key. Besides she calculates dierences of outcomes of
measuring her qubits E and M - m
1
for the rst qubit
and m
2
for the second one. Four possible cases should





Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that the value




















; q(1  q); q(1   q); (1   q)
2




= (1; 0; 0; 0). Here we write the distribution in
















= 1 (rst bit being the major












= (q; 0; 1  q; 0), P
(01)
B














), we have P
(10)
E




(0; 0; 1; 0).










, we have P
(10)
E




(0; 0; 0; 1).
Now we are ready to calculate the information on Al-
ice's quart received by Bob and Eve. This information is
calculated as I = 2 H(P ), where H(P ) is the Shannon
entropy function calculated for the distribution P :






























is found rst, and










and her information is calculated for


































= 2  2h(q)(1  p
b
); (8)





of Bob and Eve are exactly twice that for the case of bits,







(note that q can be expressed through
p
e






increases. The intersection of two curves denes
the border value of p
b
, below which Bob's information
exceeds Eve's one and therefore the standard procedure




) = 2  2h(q)(1  p
b
); (9)
3and is the same as for the 6-state protocol for quantum
cryptography with qubits, p
b
= 0:1564. In the case of
generating binary key p
b
has the sense of disturbance,
i.e. probability for Bob to get incorrect symbol in his
key. In the case of cryptography with quarts, considered
here, the intersection of two curves occurs at the same
value of p
b









= 0:2883. The growth of disturbance reects
the fact that an incorrect quart can be received when only
one bit is wrong and another one is correct. This point
was mentioned in Ref. [11], but did not deserve a detailed
consideration up to now.
The considered cryptographic protocol for generating a
key consisting from quarts can be compared to the proto-
col where 5 mutually unbiased bases in four-dimensional
Hilbert space are used [6, 7, 8]. In the latter protocol
Alice and Bob use for encoding such bases that the over-
lap of two any states from dierent bases is the same.
The rest of the protocol resembles BB84. The use of mu-
tually unbiased bases guarantees that no information on
the encoded symbol is got if an incorrect basis is chosen
for measurement. Therefore the protocol implementing
such bases should provide the best security for cryptogra-
phy with qudits. The analysis of eavesdropping by means




i = (1 D;D=3; D=3; D=3) ; (10)
I
B

















where  = D
E
=(1   D), D and D
E
being Bob's and
Eve's disturbances respectively, connected by the follow-











 are real positive parameters of the cloning


















in this case gives the
result D
(4)







is the cryptographic protocol exploiting qubit pairs for
generating a key of quarts is more secure against eaves-
dropping attacks, than the protocol, utilizing four-level
systems prepared in one of 5 mutually unbiased bases.
Besides, the former protocol provides higher key genera-
tion rate, since 1=3 of systems is used for the key, against
1=5 in the latter case.
This result is easily generalized to any value of n. If a
sequence of n qubits is used for generating a key of 2
n
-
valued symbols, then Bob's disturbance corresponding to






= 1   (1   0:1564)
n





for the case where 2
n
-dimensional systems
are used, being prepared in a state chosen from 2
n
+ 1





























where again  = D
E
=(1  D), but this time D and D
E
are connected by equations D
E
















































protocol based on qubits is more secure than that based
on qudits. Note that for symbols with more than two
values the disturbance is not limited by 1/2.

















FIG. 1: The border disturbance for sharing a key composed
from 2
n




One could conjecture that a sequence of qubits encod-
ing one quart could be eectively eavesdropped by a col-
lective attack. But this is not so, since any collective at-
tack produces correlation between attacked qubits, and
therefore can be easily detected by Bob. Undetectable
collective attack should address randomly chosen qubits,
i.e. it may to be expected to be equally successful for
qubits and qudits. Moreover, it is still unclear at present,
if collective attacks are more eective than individual
ones [3].
We conclude that the optimal dimensionality for quan-
tum cryptography is 2, i.e. two-dimensional systems are
the best tool for information encoding, like in the classical
information theory. This result leads us to two practical
4recommendations concerning implementation of quan-
tum cryptography. First, if one has two-level systems
available for quantum cryptography, there is no sense in
entangling them for producing systems of higher dimen-
sions. Second, if one has multilevel systems at hand, it is
more protable to decompose the states of each system
into direct product of two-dimensional spaces and use
them for standard cryptographic protocol with qubits.
This strategy provides better security and better key gen-
eration rate.
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